How it relates to AgenID
AgenID v1.1.1 answers the first part: which agent, and which operator declared it. It keeps DECLARED, VERIFIED and AUTHORIZED strictly separate, and AUTHORIZED has no signed object in v1.1.1. The manifest keys permissions and authorizations are reserved and rejected by a v1.1.1 validator.
A v1.2 authorization layer, with a signed grant from a principal and a way to withdraw it, is a draft in development. It is not available on agenid.com.
Why it matters
Delegation chains are where fraud hides: an agent with a real identity can still overstate what it was asked to do. Separating the two questions keeps a valid identity from being read as permission. The delegation scenario walks through it.
The reference deployment at agenid.com issues nothing above L1_REGISTERED today. L2 and higher require a VerificationAssertion signed by a root authority key, and that key has not been created yet.
What it does not mean
A registered AgenID is not evidence of delegation. It does not say who the agent represents in a given transaction or what that party approved.
It also does not say whether the operator and the principal are the same party. A booking agent may be operated by a software vendor while acting for a traveler: three parties, three separate questions.