How it relates to AgenID
A relying party resolves the identifier, reads the resolution envelope, recomputes the digest and re-runs the Ed25519 check itself. It can then fetch the operator key through two-path key discovery and compare copies. /verify runs the same checks in a browser.
Why it matters
The protocol is designed so the relying party does not have to trust the registry. A registry that lied would be caught by a relying party that follows the documented procedure, because the registry cannot forge an operator signature.
In practice a relying party weighs signals. A registered identity whose key matches the copy on the operator's own domain is a stronger signal than a registered identity alone, and both are stronger than an agent's spoken claim. It should compute the level itself from assertions that verified rather than reading a field on faith.
The reference deployment at agenid.com issues nothing above L1_REGISTERED today. L2 and higher require a VerificationAssertion signed by a root authority key, and that key has not been created yet.
What it does not mean
Verifying an identity does not decide the outcome. What the agent is allowed to do remains the relying party's own policy decision. AgenID says which agent is acting and who declared it; permission is a separate question the protocol v1.1.1 does not answer.